I.
Overview of Rules Analysis: 5-401 Relevance/Other Rules/5-403 Discretion 1.
Is the evidence relevant (does it have even a slight tendency to prove or disprove a fact that is of consequence to the case, Md. Rule 5-401)?
1. Fact witnesses testify from first-hand knowledge to relevant facts in the case, and do not give expert opinions. For example, if an arresting officer testifies to what he or she observed, the officer is merely a fact witness and Md. Rule 5-701 applies.
A fact witness may not testify to facts of which the witness has first-hand knowledge and then opine as to them -based on the witness's expertise gained from "specialized knowledge, skill, experience, or education" -unless there has been compliance with the discovery rules regarding expert testimony. Ragland v. State, 385 Md. 706, 870 A.2d 609 (2005) . But see Matoumba v. State, 390 Md. 544, 890 A.2d 288 (2006) (declining to apply Ragland holding to the testimony of a police officer in a suppression hearing).
2.
Expert witnesses may testify to their opinions, but are subject to special discovery and evidence rules.
If the arresting officer testifies, for example, that the defendant swallowed "crack cocaine," rather than "something that looked like crack cocaine," the line has been crossed. Robinson v. State, 348 Md. 104, 115-28, 702 A.2d 1263 (1997 .
3.
Necessity for expert testimony Sometimes expert testimony is required in order for a party to meet its burden of production of evidence so as to survive a motion for summary judgment or a directed verdict against it. E.g., Wood v. Toyota Motor Corp., 134 Md. App. 512, 760 A.2d 315 (2000) . See vol. 5 McLain § 300:7; Murphy § § 1401-1402. Such an expert's opinion generally must Questions be given to at least "a reasonable degree of probability." See, e.g., Impala Platinum Ltd. v. Impala Sales (U.S.A.) , Inc., 283 Md. 296, 333, 389 A.2d 887,908 (1978) (expert witness's appraisal of present value oflost profits was within guidelines of reasonable certainty rule and was properly admitted in evidence).
"[W]
here a complex and novel theory of science has been postulated," the Court of Appeals has held that the courts ought look especially closely at admissibility, especially where "the area of expertise is central to the resolution of the lawsuit. " Blackwell v. Wyeth, 408 Md. 575,627-29,971 A.2d 235 (2009) (affirming trial court's exclusion of plaintiffs , proffered experts -(1) a medical doctor and a genetic counselor, (2) a chemistry professor, (3) a pharmacology professor, (4) a pediatrician, and (5) a forensic psychiatrist, as unqualified to testify to epidemiological matters: a causal link between a mercury derivative in vaccines given to an infant and his autism and mental retardation).
1.
Police officer on narcotics squad is called to testify at trial that, based on his training and experience, what he observed: two telephone calls from separate pay phones, the movements of two vehicles, and something passing between them -was a drug transaction. This is:
A. Lay testimony.
B. Expert testimony.
Ragland v. State, 385 Md. 706, 870 A.2d 609 (2005) .
2.
A witness, a licensed driver who was on the highway at the time in question, testifies that she saw the civil defendant in an automobile tort case driving down the highway "at a very high rate of speed, tailgating, and weaving in and out of traffic." The evidence is:
A. Admissible.
B. Inadmissible.
See Beahm v. Shortall, 279 Md. 321,339-40,368 A.2d 1005 (1977 Lilly v. State, 212 Md. 436, 444, 129 A.2d 839 (1957) .
3.
The same witness testifies that the defendant was "at least negligent and I think grossly negligent. He scared me to death." The evidence is:
B.
Inadmissible.
See Baltimore v. C&O Ry. v. Moon, 118 Md. 380,391-92,84 A. 536 (1912); McCoy v. Hatmaker, 135 Md. App. 693, 720-23, 763 A.2d 1283 (2000 .
4.
A buddy is called to testify that when he saw the DUI defendant leave the bar, the defendant was drunk.
B.
Crampton v. State, 71 Md. App. 375, 388, 525 A.2d 1087 App. 375, 388, 525 A.2d (1987 , aff 'd on other grounds, 314 Md. 265, 550 A.2d 693 (1998) .
5.
Police officer is asked by the prosecutor whether the officer believes the defendant is guilty. The evidence is:
B. Inadmissible.
Crawfordv. State, 285 Md. 431, 404 A.2d 244 (1979) .
6.
Arresting police officer's testimony that he smelled marijuana smoke is:
A. Admissible lay opinion, as long as witness is familiar with the smell of marijuana through past experience.
B.
Inadmissible unless officer is qualified as an expert.
In re Ondrel M, 173 Md. App. 223, 228 & llll. 5-6,238-45,918 A.2d 543 (2007) .
III. Expert Witnesses: Overview
If expert witness testimony is offered, it may be admitted if the court finds that it would be helpful to the trier of fact, which determination is based on three criteria under Md.
Rule 5-702:
1.
2.
3.
Is the subject matter of the testimony appropriate? ------i.~ No. Inadmissible.
1
Md. Rule 5-702(2).
Yes.
Is the particular witness qualified to testify on this subject?
---l.~
No. Inadmissible.
Md. Rule 5-702(1).
Is there a sufficient factual basis, in the case, to support the expert testimony?
------i.~ No. Inadmissible.
Md. Rule 5-702(3).
Admissible (subject to Md. Rule 5-403)
4.
What is the form that expert testimony may take?
Fonn of testimony may be by opinion (Md. Rule 5-702), and the expert is not required to have first-hand knowledge ofthe underlying facts (Md. Rules 5-602 and 5-703). The fact that the opinion goes to an ultimate issue in the case does not necessarily exclude it, Md. Rule 5-704. The question generally remains whether the particular opinion will assist the trier offact, rather than be superfluous, unnecessary, or confusing. Md. Rule 5-702. See, e.g., Charles H. Steffey, Inc. v. High, 216 Md. 170, 173-74, 139 A.2d 730 (1958) ("[AJ person who is qualified by study or experience, or both, to understand and explain the subject under consideration, may testify as to the manner in which a certain device or appliance operates. The test of admissibility of such testimony is whether it would probably aid the trier of fact to draw an accurate conclusion ... from the facts already in evidence"; State Roads employee was properly permitted to testify to operation of three phase traffic signal).
In criminal cases, there is a special caveat: experts permitted by statute, Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 9-120, may testify on an ultimate issue of sanity ("criminal responsibility") but otherwise may not state an opinion as to whether the defendant had a mental state or condition necessary for the charged crime. Md. Rule 5-704(b).
5.
Must the expert first give a detailed basis for his or her opinion?
The court may permit the expert to testify to his or her opinion, and "reasons" for it, "without first testifying to the underlying facts or data," Md. Rule 5-705, as long as the court is satisfied that there is a sufficient factual basis for the opinion. Md. Rule 5-702(3). (lfthe court has doubts on that point, it may require the expert to first testify to the underlying facts or data. Md. Rule 5-705.)
6.
What if the underlying facts are inadmissible in evidence?
The expert may base his or her opinion on otherwise inadmissible hearsay, as long as it is shown to be "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field informing opinions or inferences on the subject. ... " Md. Was it of a type reasonably relied on by experts in that field? (The court may require disclosure of that hearsay basis outside the hearing of the jury, see Md. Rule 5-1 04( c ) (court "shall" do so when "the interests of justice" so require), so that the court may rule, under Md. Rule 5-1 04( a), on the admissibility of the opinion under Md. Yes. Opinion admissible (subject to Md. Rule 5-403, and in criminal cases, subject to the accused's confrontation right).
7.
Should an otherwise inadmissible hearsay basis be admitted on direct examination for the limited purpose of explaining the expert's opinion?
If the court finds that such basis is "[i] trustworthy, [ii] necessary to illuminate testimony, and [iii] unprivileged," then it has the discretion to pennit disclosure to the jury on direct. If it does so, then, upon request, the court shall give a limiting instruction to the jury "to use those facts and data only for the purpose of evaluating the validity and probative value of the expert's opinion or inference." Md. Rules 5-703(b); 5-105.
Regardless of whether the court pennits such disclosure on direct, the opponent may freely cross-examine the expert regarding the basis of his or her opinion. Md. 
IV. Qualifications of the Particular Witness as an Expert
Is the witness "qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education," in the area as to which the proponent offers the witness as an expert? • Once a scientific principle is statutorily approved, judicially noticed, or found to meet the Frye-Reed standard, the results of the tests that rely on that principle will be admitted if three more prerequisites are met:
. . . .
1.
Any equipment necessary for perfonning the test was in working order;
2.
The person operating the equipment or perfonning the test was qualified to do so; and 3. That person did so properly.
Questions

8.
A psychiatrist who interviewed the victim and has written extensively on child abuse is asked whether he believes the alleged sexual abuse victim's testimony. The evidence is:
B.
Inadmissible. v. State, 312 Md. 266, 277,539 A.2d 657 (1988) .
See Bohnert
9.
A police officer with significant training and experience in law enforcement regarding illicit drugs is called by the State to testify as to the street value of recovered drugs, how much an addict would purchase at a time, and that the amount of drugs was not for personal consumption.
A. Admissible in the court's discretion.
B.
Inadmissible as a matter oflaw. 350, 361-65, 670 A.2d 951 (1996) (no error in striking experts' testimony as lacking sufficient basis).
See
B.
Reliability, Absent Statutory Recognition of Judicial Notice
Frye-Reed Still Good Law in Maryland
In a four-to-three decision in Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978) , the Court of Appeals affirmed the exclusion of "voiceprint" evidence on the ground that it was not generally accepted in the scientific community. Judge Eldridge, writing for the majority, supported the court's decision to adopt the Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923 test on the following grounds:
(1) To admit evidence on which the scientific community disagrees would invite a confusing, time-consuming battle of the experts in each trial;
(2) Such a battle would require the fact finder to resolve a dispute which even the relevant scientific community could not resolve; (3) Inconsistent results would no doubt occur; (4) Those could cause verdicts at odds with each other, solely because one fact-finder gave credence to a scientific principle and another did not, when, in fact, the principle was either universally true or not; and (5) The fact-finder might be tempted to give undue weight to any so-called "scientific" evidence. This temptation might be especially great when the scientific evidence, like that of the voiceprint in Reed, is offered scientifically to identify the perpetrator of the crime for which the defendant is being tried.
In light of the desire for consistency, there is no presumption of correctness of a trial court's finding of general acceptance under the Frye-Reed standard; the question on appeal is merely whether the trial court's finding is "against the weight of the evidence rather than whether it is clearly erroneous." Cobey v. State, 73 Md. App. 233, 239, 533 A.2d 944 (1987) . In reviewing the trial court's decision, "the appellate court may consider evidence which was not presented to the trial court." !d.
Judge Smith, joined by Chief Judge Robert Murphy and Judge Orth, dissented in Reed. The dissenters would have admitted the voiceprint evidence and let any dispute about its validity go to its weight. In an approach prescient of Daubert, they argued that the court should require only that scientific evidence have "reasonable reliability," rather than general acceptance. The dissent argued:
(1) Maryland had not followed the 1923 Frye case before 1978;
(2) The Frye standard would exclude a great deal of probative scientific evidence; its application might cause the judicial system to lag years or decades behind scientific advances; (3) The Frye standard developed in a case involving polygraphs, which pose special problems; (4) Courts admit much evidence that is of questionable reliability, including eyewitness testimony and voice identifications by lay witnesses, without imposing such a high standard;
(5) The Frye standard does not give juries enough credit for being able to weigh scientific evidence, which can be attacked on cross-examination; and (6) The Frye standard is unclear about how the proof it requires may be produced. For example, there can be a problem in the determination of what is the relevant scientific community under Frye. Those who study a new field -such as voiceprintsand are in its forefront are sometimes discredited by the courts as having too much of a personal stake in the process' validity. But those in related fields -such as physiology, anatomy, and acoustical sciences -may be unlikely to know enough to make an informed judgment.
When it adopted Title 5, the Court of Appeals left to development through the case law whether it would continue to adhere to ii. But the court must conduct a Frye-Reed hearing if the expert is proposing a novel theory, even one based on his or her own observations, experience, and study.
In Blackwell v. Wyeth, 408 Md. 575 (2009), the plaintiffs brought suit alleging that their child's autism and mental retardation were caused by vaccinations containing the preservative thimerosal (an ethyl mercury derivative) that he received as an infant. Circuit Court Judge Berger entered summary judgment for the defendants upon concluding that the plaintiffs had failed to show that their experts' opinions as to causation, and the underlying analysis, met Frye-Reed. The Court of Appeals, in an extensive, unanimous opinion by Judge Battaglia, affirmed. It reviewed (1) de novo the legal question of admissibility under Frye-Reed, and (2) the exclusion of the plaintiffs' experts as unqualified, under the more deferential standard of abuse of discretion.
Judge Battaglia characterized the first question as involving "the application of the Frye-Reed test to the analysis undertaken by an expert where the underlying data and methods of gathering this data are generally accepted in the scientific community but applied to support a novel theory." She reviewed numerous well-respected studies which Circuit Court Judge Berger had reviewed, that had concluded that the scientific evidence to date shows no link between thimerosal and autism.
The plaintiffs' principal expert and his son had conducted the only studies showing such a link "in a small number of genetically susceptible individuals." But the methodology of their studies had been criticized by the American Academy of Pediatrics and the National Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine. In reevaluating the trial court's resolution of the Frye-Reed issue, the Court of Appeals explicitly borrowed from the "reliability" analysis of the federal courts (although the federal courts had applied Daubert). Following their reasoning, the Maryland court held that "[g]eneraUy accepted methodology must be coupled with generally accepted analysis," so that expert opinion based on " 'too great a leap' " must be excluded. 442,594 A.2d 1248 (1991) , where the Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court committed reversible error in applying the Frye-Reed standard to a doctor's opinion testimony as to how asbestos directly causes cancer. The appellate court held that the doctor should have been permitted to testifY, when he testified his opinion rose to a "reasonable medical probability," "even though he could not state that the theory he espoused was generally accepted by the medical community." It reasoned that the Frye doctrine did not apply, because the doctor was not testifYing as to "the validity of a new scientific technique" such as lie detector tests, breathalyzer tests, or paraffin tests. Myers relied on Allewalt to hold that Frye-Reed does not extend" 'to medical opinion evidence which is not presented as a scientific test the results of which were controlled by inexorable, physical laws. ' " Again, in CSXv. Miller, 159 Md. App. 123,858 A.2d 1025 (2004 figure as to the probability of a non-match than has been given in some cases, or using "a phrase such as 'very highly probable,' without quantification"). acceptability of the general theory and the use of these specific [DNA] techniques. Beyond such judicial notice [in Maryland, statutory recognition], the threshold for admissibility should require only a preliminary showing of reliability of the particular data to be offered, i.e., some indication of how the laboratory work was done and what analysis and assumptions underlie the probability calculations. The probability data may well vary among different segments of the population. Affidavits should normally suffice to provide a sufficient basis for admissibility. DNA profiling evidence should be excluded only when the government cannot show this threshold level of reliability in its data. The district court should focus on whether accepted protocol was adequately followed in a specific case, but the court, in exercising its discretion, should be mindful that this issue should go more to the weight than to the admissibility of the evidence. Rarely should such a factual determination be excluded from jury consideration. With adequate cautionary instructions from the trial judge, vigorous cross-examination of the government's experts, and challenging testimony from defense experts, the jury should be allowed to make its own factual determination as to whether the evidence is reliable. In light of the advances made in DNA analysis since Armstead was decided in 1996, the Court of Appeals held in 2005 that "when a DNA method [here PCR]6 analyzes genetic markers at sufficient locations to arrive at an infinitestimal random match probability, expert opinion testimony of a match and of the source of the DNA evidence is admissible," Young v. State, 388 Md. 99, 100,879 A.2d 44 (2005) , and "the expert is not required to accompany his 'match' testimony with contextual statistics." !d. at 105. In Young, the trial court had committed no error in admitting expert testimony, following an analysis of 13 loci, that to "a reasonable degree of scientific certainty (in the absence of an identical twin)" the defendant was the source of the analyzed DNA. Id. at 103. Judge Raker, writing for a unanimous court, noted, however, that if the accused has a close relative, "typically" a sibling, "who could have been the source of the DNA evidence," because he or she is "in the pool of potential contributors of crime scene evidence," then "the expert's caveat should take into account the higher random match probability for close relatives, not only identical twins." !d. at 120 n.12.
United
iii. The Court of Appeals used the Frye-Reed test in concluding that "repressed memory" was insufficiently distinguishable from mere forgetting so as to toll an otherwise applicable statute oflimitations. Doe v. Maskell, 342 Md. 684, 694, 679 A.2d 1087 (1996 ("While the existence of consensus (or lack thereof) in the scientific community is a more familiar inquiry within the context of determining the admissibility of scientific evidence under the test enunciated in Reed, it is also a useful measure for this court to evaluate the acceptance, and acceptability of a scientific theory.").
Dog Tracking
Questions
13.
A clinical social worker wishes to testifY that an alleged victim of child sexual abuse is suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as a result of being sexual abused. Is the evidence ofPTSD subject to Frye-Reed?
A. Yes.
B.
No.
See Hutton v. State, 339 Md. 480,495 n.10, 663 A.2d 1289 (1995 .
14.
In 13., may the psychiatrist testifY to her conclusion that the victim was sexually abused and was not "faking" her symptoms?
No. 463 (4th Cir. 1975 ) ("Unless an exaggerated popular opinion of the accuracy of a particular technique makes its use prejudicial or likely to mislead the jury, it is better to admit relevant scientific evidence in the same manner as other expert testimony and allow its weight to be attacked by cross-examination and refutation."). These latter courts applied the general relevance standard of Fed. R. Evid. 401, coupled with Fed. R. Evid. 702's admonition that any expert testimony must be helpful to the trier of fact.
Hutton. See Hall
Then the trial court must consider Fed. R. Evid. 403: if the helpful, probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the considerations of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading or distraction of the trier of fact, or waste of time, the trial court, in its discretion, should exclude the evidence.
ii. Daubert
In Daubert the United States Supreme Court joined this 401-702-403 camp. The Court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence rejected Frye, although the degree of acceptance of a particular method or test within the scientific community remains a relevant factor for the trial court to consider in performance of its limited "gatekeeping role" to keep out junk science. The Court declined to set forth a "definitive" test for the admission of novel scientific evidence pursuant to its "reliability approach," 509 U.S. at 595 n.12, but offered the following "general observations. "
Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be (and has been) tested. * * * Another pertinent consideration is whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication. Publication (which is but one element of peer review) is not a sine qua non of admissibility .... * * * Additionally, in the case of a particular scientific technique, the court ordinarily should consider the known or potential rate of error. . .. Finally, "general acceptance" can yet have a bearing on the inquiry. A "reliability assessment does not require, although it does permit, explicit identification of a relevant scientific community and an express determination of a particular degree of acceptance within that community." Widespread acceptance can be an important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible, and "a known technique that has been able to attract only minimal support within the community," may properly be viewed with skepticism.
Id. at 593-94.
The DaubertlKumho Tire 401-702-403 approach is more flexible and, on its face, more liberal than Frye, as the Daubert Court relies not on a strict rule of preclusion of evidence, but on "the adversary system": "Vigorous crossexamination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence." Id. at 596.
Yet it does not permit the introduction of evidence unless the supporting proof suffices "to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the position [taken] more likely than not is true .... " Id. For example, on remand the Daubert court reached the same conclusion it had reached when it erroneously had applied Frye: it found the plaintiff s proffered evidence that Bendectin, an antinausea drug prescribed during pregnancy, had caused severe birth defects, and again granted defendants' motion for summary judgment.
The flexibility ofthe Daubert test also could permit a court to exclude scientific evidence that while still "generally accepted," has begun to be proved umeliable. All in all, Daubert has engendered thorough pretrial vetting by federal judges of proffered expert testimony in every field. As explained by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit:
A district court considering the admissibility of expert testimony exercises a gate keeping function to assess whether the proffered evidence is sufficiently reliable and relevant. The inquiry to be undertaken by the district court is "a flexible one" focusing on the "principles and methodology" employed by the expert, not on the conclusions reached. In making its initial determination of whether proffered testimony is sufficiently reliable, the court has broad latitude to consider whatever factors bearing on validity that the court finds to be useful; the particular factors will depend upon the unique circumstances of the expert testimony involved. The court, however, should be conscious of two guiding, and sometimes competing, principles. On the one hand, the court should be mindful that Rule 702 was intended to liberalize the introduction of relevant expert evidence. And, the court need not determine that the expert testimony a litigant seeks to offer into evidence is irrefutable or certainly correct. As with all other admissible evidence, expert testimony is subject to being tested by " [v] igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof." On the other hand, the court must recognize that due to the difficulty of evaluating their testimony, expert witnesses have the potential to "be both powerful and quite misleading." And, given the potential persuasiveness of expert testimony, proffered evidence that has a greater potential to mislead than to enlighten should be excluded. The proponent of expert evidence can escape Frye scrutiny if he or she can convince the trial judge that: (1) the expert is relying on a traditional theory or technique; (2) the expert is offering soft scientific testimony; or (3) the witness's expertise is non-scientific in character. If the trial judge finds that any of these contentions applies in the pending case, the judge will not subject the expert's testimony to the general acceptance test.).
4.
Just 2002) (Daubert applies; arresting officer could not refer, at trial on merits (as opposed to probable cause issue) to field sobriety tests-''walk and tum," "one leg stand," and "horizontal gaze nystagmus"-as tests, as they fail to meet Daubert standards when offered to prove blood alcohol, content; officer could testify to observations; "In so doing, however, the officer may not use value-added descriptive language to characterize the subject's performance of the SFSTs, such as saying that the subject 'failed the test' or 'exhibited' a certain number of 'standardized clues' during the test"). See United States v. Van Hazel, 468 F.Supp.2d 792, 795-97 (E.D.N.C. 2007 ) (rejecting Horn's reasoning but excluding results altogether ofHGN test, as a "scientific test" which required evidence of test's reliability, judicial notice being inappropriate). 
ii. Maryland
In Murphy v. State, 184 Md. 70, 86, 40 A.2d 239 (1944) , the Court of Appeals took "judicial notice of the fact that the use of fingerprints is an infallible means of identification. "
More recently, the reliability of identification based on partial or "latent" prints has been questioned. Attracting national attention, Baltimore County Circuit Court Judge Susan M. Souder ruled in October 2007 that the " , prosecution's experts could not testify at all regarding the ACE-V methodology when applied to partial "latent" prints. State v. Rose (No. K06-0545) (BaIt. Co. Cir. Ct., Oct. 19,2007) . In light of the proven occurrence of "false positives" in other cases, Judge Souder found that the State expert's proffered testimony, that "there is no error rate for ACE-V" and that he was 1 00% certain that the latent prints were the defendant's was "not credible" and his entire testimony was inadmissible (though she demurred that, because "ACE-V methodology is changing," ACE-V evidence might be admissible in the future). Id. at 25. She seemed to apply a Daubert analysis rather than Frye-Reed, as she did not specifically find that the defense had proven that latent fingerprint analysis had lost general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.
Excluding all of the fingerprint evidence precluded the jury from learning that the partial prints matched the defendant's known, rolled prints on at least several Galton points and did not exclude the defendant as having been at the scene. After Judge Souder reaffinned her ruling, the State felt it could not go forward with the case, and the U.S. Attorney stepped in to consider pursuing a federal The State's witness in the Howard County case proffered that "he was able to fonn an opinion within a reasonable degree of certainty as to the identity of the person that left the latent print. ... " Id. at 11. Judge Sweeney held that he would pennit the expert to testify that he had found a close or exact "match" between the defendant's known print and the partial latent print, but not that "no other person in the world's print could also match the latents," as "currently validated science" does not go that far. !d. at 21-23. The court held that the defense was free to cross examine as to the "alleged flaws" in the ACE-V method, as well as to call its own expert. Is there a better way? One possibility for a compromise modification of Frye-Reed is that adopted by the Uniform Law Commissioners. U.R.E. 702 (1999) uses Frye as the initial test, but a party dissatisfied with the result under Frye may challenge it by relying on the Daubert factors to prove that it is "more probable than not that the principle or method" is reasonably reliable (or not).
See Myrna Raeder, Proposed Revisions to the Uniform Rules of
Evidence, AALS Evidence Section Newsletter, 2-3, Spring 1998 ("This proposal was believed to give judges the benefit of relying on the scientific community at the outset, while still giving the adverse litigant the opportunity to demonstrate the actual reliability or unreliability of the principle or methodology in question. Ultimately, a rule codifying Daubert was viewed as requiring the judge to make a reliability determination in virtually every case, while this hybrid standard would both cut down the amount of challenges and also reestablish the judge's ability to rely on the scientific community until challenged, rather than requiring an independent evaluation of reliability from the outset.").
